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1 Introduction
Decentralization has been at the core of the debate on government organization during
the last decades. Nowadays, scal decentralization is an objective in both developed and
developing countries that is promoted by international organizations such as the World
Bank.
The economic theory has identied several reasons that explain why decentralized gov-
ernments may do better. The usual argument is that local governments have better in-
formation on local preferences (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Besides, local governments
may be more productive for several reasons. Among these, it has been argued that local
governments are more accountable to citizens and (Seabright, 1996) that this increased
accountability implies improved accomplishment of their tasks. Decentralization may also
foster the initiative of local politicians provided that they have political career concerns
(Aghion and Tirole (1997), Myerson (2006) and Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007)). How-
ever, local governments may be more likely to be captured by interest groups (Bardhan,
2002).
The benets of decentralization have been measured empirically in both developed and
developing countries. For instance, Faguet (2004) points out that the decentralization in
Bolivia has improved responsiveness of government to local needs (matching preferences).
Barankay and Lockwood (2007) show that scal decentralization has improved educational
attainment in Swiss cantons (productive eciency).
The aim of this paper is to assess the relationship between decentralization and con-
tracting with the private sector. I rst develop a model of incomplete contracts a la Hart,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) in which local governments choose what proportion of a divis-
ible project is contracted with the private sector. Local governments may contract with a
public manager or a private manager. Managers may make two (non-contractible) innova-
tions: a quality increasing innovation (QII) and a cost reducing innovation (CRI). I show
that more decentralized local governments assigns a larger fraction of the project to the
private manager if gains from private QII outweighs losses from private CRI. Then, I under-
take an empirical analysis using the 2001 decentralization reform in Colombia. The 2001
reform is a complex reform of the nancing and the provision of public services, mainly,
education and health.
With respect to education, the reform has two main characteristics: rst, it establishes
a process to certify certain municipalities (the local governments). This process consisted
of two parts: the devolution of the teachers' payroll and the reorganization of schools. The
certied municipalities are more decentralized since they receive more responsibilities in
the provision of public education. The reform devolved the management of personnel and
other resources (buildings, material, etc.) to those municipalities. The non-certied munic-
ipalities are less decentralized since they only received the management of other resources
dierent from personnel. Second, the reform allowed the more decentralized municipali-
ties to sign contracts with private schools, as an additional strategy to increase enrolment.
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Departments (the regional governments) are entitled to sign this type of contracts for the
less decentralized municipalities.
How might the reform aect enrolment in pre-college school? First, it provides sub-
national governments (departments and municipalities) with strong incentives to increase
enrolment, since the national transfer received by these governments depends on the num-
ber of pupils enroled in public schools and subsidized in private schools. Thus it is very
likely that the reform has increased enrolment. Second, the reform established two parallel
organizations for the provision of education: In one system, municipalities are more decen-
tralized (the certied ones) and in the other system, municipalities are less decentralized
(the non-certied ones).
These types of municipalities may dier in performance. Even if national transfers
provide incentives to enrol children and contracts with the private sector are based solely
on the number of pupils, regional and local governments not only care about enrolment
but also about education quality. Therefore, if the amount of pupils deteriorates education
quality, the local government will care about the fraction of pupils assigned to private
schools.
Enrolling children in private schools may be more productive than enrolling them in
public schools at least for two reasons. First, because it reduces quality deterioration in
public schools. Second, because private schools are both more accountable to parents and
less likely to be controlled by interest groups like teachers' unions. It is then very likely that
the CRI in the private school is not very costly in terms of quality deterioration. The main
theoretical result mentioned above may be re-expressed in the following terms: the more
decentralized municipalities contract a larger fraction of non-enrolled pupils with private
schools if, in the private school, the reduction in quality that comes from the CRI is not
larger than the increase in quality that comes from the QII.
I test the hypothesis that the more decentralized municipalities contract more enrolment
with private school than the less decentralized municipalities do. I will not measure the
general eect of the reform on enrolment. Rather, I look for dierences among the two
parallel organizations regarding the strategies they use to increase enrolment: either enrol
children in public schools or sign subsidy contracts to enrol them in private schools.
I identify the eect of decentralization on enrolment exploiting the fact that the law
established an exogenous rule to decentralize: all municipalities with more than 100 thou-
sand inhabitants in 2001 must undertake the certication process, that is, must receive
and manage the teachers' payroll and reorganize public schools. The departments must
do so for the education provision in . This exogenous rule allows me to estimate causal
eects with a Regression Discontinuity Design approach. The approach allows for variables
that may aect enrolment to be very dierent on average among certied and non-certied
municipalities, but it presumes that those variables are not very dierent in a small neigh-
borhood around the cuto dening the treatment. Then, assuming that all observable
and non-observable variables that may aect enrolment are smoothly distributed around
the threshold, any discontinuity in enrolment may be credibly attributed to the reform.
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Identication relies on continuity checks of relevant variables.
The main empirical result of this paper suggests that more decentralized municipalities
(i.e. the certied municipalities) subsidize more students in private schools than do less
decentralized municipalities. The dierences are particularly signicant in primary and
lower secondary levels all along the period of study. The dierence represents around 20%
of enrolment in private schools and 3% of the school-age population. The result is robust to
dierences in education prices (tuition fees), the size of population of school age, variables
of public nance (income and spending of municipalities), political economy, poverty and
violence.
In addition, the paper shows that, although enrolment in public schools has increased
after the reform, there are no signicant dierences among more decentralized and less
decentralized municipalities. The more decentralized municipalities seem to have enroled
more pupils in upper secondary in 2002, but the dierence does not pass all the robustness
checks.
This paper is also important because it sheds some light on policies that are eective
in developing countries. Contracting with private schools may be an important strategy to
improve enrolment rates in developing countries. Recent literature has provided evidence on
this issue, for instance, Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, and Kremer (2002) and Angrist,
Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) have shown that the PACES program, a voucher program
implemented in mid-nineties in Colombia, increased enrolment and academic achievement
of pupils.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides context on public
education in Colombia and describes the reform in detail. Section 3 presents a theoretical
model that gathers the main economic traits of the reform and provides a hypothesis.
Section 4 discusses the empirical framework, and presents the identication strategy and
descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents main empirical results and robustness checks.
Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Colombia and its Reform
Pre-college education in Colombia consists of 12 mandatory years divided into three levels:
1 mandatory year of pre-primary, 5 years of primary and 6 years of secondary (divided into
4 years of lower secondary and 2 years of upper secondary). Education is one of the most
important components of the public sector in Colombia. In 2001, 36% of central government
tax revenues were allocated to public education, teachers constitute the largest group of
public employees (26% of total public employees in 1999) and the public expenditures on
education increased to 3.8% GDP on average in the 1990s. Besides, 7.2 million students
attended public schools (75% of all students), and were taught by 290 thousand teachers
(68% of all teachers) in 52 thousand schools (75% of total schools).
Decentralization has been in process since 1986. On political grounds, citizens began
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to elect mayors of municipalities, who previously were appointed by the President of the
Republic. Under the Political Constitution adopted in 1991, citizens also began to elect de-
partment governors. On economic grounds, the main rules on decentralization of education
are included in Law 60 of 1993, which establishes the responsibilities of each government
tier in the provision of education and the rules and formulae to distribute national revenues
to the lower governments. This law was revoked by Law 715 of 2001.
The 2001 reform has three main components. First, it establishes two parallel organi-
zations for the provision of education, one more decentralized than the other. To become
more decentralized, municipalities must carry out a certication process. Second, the re-
form proposes an exogenous rule for municipalities to qualify for the certication, that is,
to have the more decentralized provision of education. Third, it allows certied entities to
sign subsidy contracts with private schools. I will explain these components in the rest of
the section.
First, the reform establishes two parallel ways to organize the provision of education,
one more decentralized than the other. In the more decentralized organization, municipal-
ities deal with the management of both personnel and non-personnel inputs. In the less
decentralized organization, municipalities manage the non-personnel inputs and depart-
ments manage the personnel. The mechanism for making national transfers establishes a
per-pupil budget for each type of input, so that more decentralized municipalities receive
both budgets for each enroled pupil and the less decentralized municipalities only receive
the budget corresponding to the non-personnel input.
Second, all the departments must carry out the certication process. Besides, the reform
established an exogenous rule for municipal certication, which says that municipalities
with more than 100 thousand inhabitants in 2001 must be certied. Those municipalities
with less than 100 thousand inhabitants in 2001 must not follow the certication process
(but may do so afterwards). Therefore, after the reform, the smallest municipalities have
a less decentralized organization and the largest municipalities have a more decentralized
organization.
This rule is completely exogenous since municipalities must attain the ocial 2001 pop-
ulation size from the National Statistics Oce to nd out whether they need to undertake
certication. This allows me to consider the reform as a quasi-experiment to analyze the
eect of decentralization on enrolment.
Municipal certication consists of a reorganization of both personnel (teachers, prin-
cipals, administrative personnel) and schools, with the aim of devolution of the optimal
personnel payrolls from the departments to to the certied municipalities. The reorganiza-
tion of personnel is based on the minimum pupils-per-teacher ratios and the organization
of the labor time of teachers established by law. The reorganization of schools has the aim
of consolidating individual schools into larger institutions providing preschool, primary and
secondary education under the administration of a single principal. Forty (40) municipal-
ities were certied in 2003. Four districts were certied automatically under law as were
the departments. Two municipalities (Pasto and Armenia) had already been certied in
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1997 under the Law 601.
Third, certied entities (departments and municipalities) may contract with private
schools to increase enrolment. The private schools interested in signing subsidy contracts
must previously inscribe themselves into a list of potential private providers, before the
respective certied government. The aim of this inscription is to make the contracting
process clearer and to guarantee a minimum level of education quality. However, being on
the list does not mean signing a subsidy contract.
Subsidy contracts last one year (the school year) and establish a per-pupil price and
a number of pupils. Mayors and governors must choose a school or schools from the
private schools on the list. Although mayors and governors are free to negotiate prices, the
contracted price must not exceed the per-pupil budget transferred by the nation. Indeed,
since governments have all bargaining power, the actual contracted price has been a part
of the per-pupil transfer.
To sum up, the reform introduced strong incentives for municipalities to increase en-
rolment either by enroling more pupils in public schools or by subsidizing pupils in private
schools. It also established two parallel organizations of provision of education, one more
decentralized than the other; and an exogenous rule that assigns each municipality to one
of the two organizations. This allows me to use the reform as a quasi-experiment to study
the eect of decentralization on the number of pupils enroled in pre-college school.
3 A theoretical model
The reform may be considered as entitling local governments with one project: enrolling
children in schools. Both departments and municipalities received the correct incentives to
do so. However, these governments not only care about increasing the number of enrolled
children but also care about education quality. In education as in other services, there is a
potential trade-o between the objective of maximizing the number of enrolled pupils and
maximizing quality education. Since children out from school is around 15% of population
in schooling age (almost 50% for upper secondary education) in 2002, the project, subject
of the reform, has important scale eects, i.e. enrolling children may have important eects
on education quality.
I build up a model based on Hart et al. (1997). Although the model is very abstract,
it draws important insights about the economics of the reform. The model considers a
divisible project. The (local) government, G, must choose what proportion of the project
will be performed by the private manager (private school), MP , and what proportion by
the public manager (public school), MG. Both the private and the public manager may
implement a cost reducing innovation (CRI) and a quality increasing innovation (QII).
These innovations are not contractible and require managers to exert eort. I denote
1All the departments, except for the poorest department, Choco, were also certied under the previous
law. Choco was certied automatically with the new law in 2001.
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eorts as e and i, respectively. If innovations happen, renegotiation occurs. CRI reduces
the project cost in c(e) and reduces social benet of the project in b(e) (due to a reduction
in education quality). The net eect of the QII on the social benet is (i).
The crucial assumption of my model is that the reduction in quality due to the CRI,
b(e), is aected by the fraction of the project assigned. The larger the fraction the larger
the reduction. Formally, let  be the fraction of the project assigned to the private sector.
The social benet that comes from the private manager's action is  [B0   b(e) + (i)].
The fraction of the original project, B0, assigned to the private manager is aected
by his prior eorts. The social benet that comes from the public manager's action is
(1 ) [B0   (1  )b(e) + (i)]. The assumption gathers the scale eect mentioned above.
It reects the fact that putting more students in the same classroom is less costly than
building new classrooms for the new students. The literature on economics of education has
drawn attention to the negative relationship between classroom size and education quality
(Angrist and Lavy, 1999). The model in Hart et al. (1997) does not have this assumption.
Therefore, in their model the project is assigned either to the public manager or to the
private manager.
The total social benet B that comes from the project is
B =  [B0   b(e) + (i)] + (1  ) [B0   (1  )b(e) + (i)]
The total social benet from the original project, B0 is aected by the prior eorts
from managers. The rst term in the RHS correspond to the benet from the contract
with the private manager. The second term corresponds to the benet from contract with
the public manager. The cost of project is equal to C = C0   c(e). Since eorts e and i
are costly for managers then the overall cost for managers is C + e+ i = C0   c(e) + e+ i.
It is assumed that gains from renegotiation are split 50 : 50. It is also assumed that
only the possessor of the residual control rights has the right to approve any innovation.
Any innovation in the public school must be approved by the government. No innovation
in private school must be approved by the government. However, only the CR Innovation
is in the interest of the private school. The QI Innovation in private school will require
renegotiation, otherwise no payment will come from the QII. Notice that in the case of
the public school, the government will re the public manager once the innovations are
done. In particular it is assumed that G can realize a fraction 1  of the gains from both
innovations by the public manager. Coecient  gathers specic human capital embodied
in MG and institutional aspects like union strength. When  = 1 the public manager is
irreplaceable.
The government pays price P0 to the manager. The payo for the manager of the public
school is
UMG = (1  )

P0   C0 + 
2
(c(e) + (i)  (1  )b(e))  e  i

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MG must renegotiate on both innovations.
The payo for the manager of the private school is
UMP = 

P0   C0 + 1
2
(i) + c(e)  e  i

MP only renegotiates on the quality innovation.
Finally, the payo for the government is
UG = (1  )

B0   P0 + (1  
2
) (c(e) + (i)  (1  )b(e))

+p

B0   P0 + 1
2
(i)  b(e)
 (1)
The proportion p 2 [0; 1] is a measure of decentralization. The larger p is, the deeper de-
centralization is. This coecient gathers the fact that non-certied municipalities cannot
contract directly with private schools. A fraction of the benets from contracts with the
private school goes to the department. In general p 6= 0 because non-certied municipal-
ities have the information on the number of children to be potentially enrolled in private
schools. Indeed, the non-certied municipalities may dier in bargaining power regarding
the department. Larger municipalities and pivotal municipalities in politics may enjoy
larger bargaining power.
I assume that functions c and  satisfy Inada conditions. That is, c(0) = 0, c
0
> 0,
c
0
(0) = 1, c0(1) = 0, c00 < 0 and (0) = 0, 0 > 0, 0(0) = 1, 0(1) = 0, 00 < 0.
Besides, function b satises b(0) = 0, b
0  0, b00  0. Finally, I assume that c0   b0 > 0, i.e.,
that the Cost Reducing Innovation is valuable.
Timing is as follows: rst G chooses ; then, G writes contract(s) with MG and/or
MP . Afterwards, MG and MP choose eorts i and e. Finally, if no renegotiation, the basic
good is supplied. However, renegotiation will occur.
From now on let us assume that  = 1 (the public employee is irreplaceable) and
p = 1 (the government is completely decentralized). The rst assumption is plausible in a
context with a strong teachers union. In Colombia, school principals are teachers elected
as directive personnel.
3.1 The rst best
Consider the rst best as a benchmark. The maximum social welfare is obtained by
solving
max
;e;i
fc(e) + (i)   (1  )2 + 2 b(e)  e  ig
The optimal  is  = 12 . Since the quality reduction of cost innovation depends on
the fraction of the project given to each manager, the optimal fraction is to give half of
the project to each manager. Any deviation will cause additional reductions in education
quality. The rst order conditions for e and i are
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c0(e)  1
2
b0(e) = 1
0(i) = 1
3.2 Equilibrium
Both MG and MP take 
e as given, since it is chosen by the government in a previous
stage.
The problem for MG is max
e;i
(1   e)

1
2
(c(e) + (i)  (1  e)b(e))  e  i

. Let us
denote the unique solution by (eG; iG), then the rst order conditions are
1
2
 
c0(eG)  (1  e)b0(eG)

= 1
1
2
 
0(iG)

= 1
The problem forMP is max
e;i
e

1
2(i) + c(e)  e  i

. Let us denote the unique solution
by (eP ; iP ), then the rst order conditions are
c0(eP ) = 1
1
2
0(iP ) = 1
Proposition 1 eP > e
, iP < i, eG < e and iG  iP < i (with iG < iM unless  = 1)
Proof
See Hart et al. (1997).
In the rst stage, G maximizes its utility with respect to 
max

(1  ) B0   P0 + 12 (c(eG) + (iG)  (1  )b(eG))+


B0   P0 + 12(iP )  b(eP )

s:t:  2 [0; 1]
The rst order condition for the interior solution is
@UG
@ =  

B0   P0 + 12 (c(eG) + (iG)  (1  )b(eG))

+12(1  )b(eG)
+

B0   P0 + 12(iP )  b(eP )

 b(eP ) = 0
From which
G =
b(eG)  12 c(eG)
b(eG)+2b(eP )
9
Proposition 2 The proportion in equilibrium e assigned to the private sector is
e =

0 if c(eG)  2b(eG)
G if c(eG) < 2b(eG)
Proof It comes directly by examining G and taking into account that e must be in [0; 1]:
The proportion e is equal to zero if the reduction in cost coming from CRI is very
large (twice the reduction in quality). This so due to the fact that the public manager is
irreplaceable. Notice that the interior solution, G, is always smaller than 12 . To see this,
suppose that is not true. Then, G > 12 . From the expression for 
G it can be seen that the
inequality holds only if b(eG)   c(eG) > 2b(eP ). The last expression is not possible under
my assumptions because the LHS term is always negative and the RHS term is always
positive. Then,
Proposition 3 The proportion e in equilibrium is always smaller than the proportion in
the rst best,  = 12 .
The result comes from the fact that the government only internalizes half of the net
benet from quality innovation in the private school. Furthermore, government bears
all benet reduction (quality reduction) from cost innovation in the private school while
perceives no benets from the cost reduction coming from that innovation.
Let us now consider the case p < 1. The following proposition holds
Proposition 4 The proportion e assigned to the private manager increases with decen-
tralization if b(eP ) < B0   P0 + 12(iP ).
Proof Maximizing Equation (1) (making p < 1 and  = 1) with respect to , we obtain
that the interior solution is given by
G =
b(eG)  12c(eG)  (1  p)

B0   P0 + 12(iP )

b(eG) + 2pb(eP )
(2)
Decentralization is gathered by coecient p. Taking the partial derivative with respect
to p,
@G
@p
=
B0   P0 + 12(iP )  2Gb(eP )
2pb(eP ) + b(eG)
(3)
Equation (3) is positive if G <   B0 P0+
1
2
(iP )
2b(eP )
. Since (iG) = (iP ), plugging
expression (2) in (3) and making some calculations gives
B0   P0 + 1
2
(c(eG) + (iG)  b(eG))

  1
2
b(eG) >   b(eG)
2b(eP )
(B0   P0 + 1
2
(iP )) (4)
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Since B0   P0 + 12 (c(eG) + (iG)  b(eG)) > 0, a sucient condition for Inequality in
Equation (4) to hold is B0   P0 + 12(iP ) > b(eP ). Therefore, in that case, G is smaller
than  and @
G
@p > 0.
Coecient p has two contrary eects on the government's utility: it increases the benet
coming from contracting with private school, increasing utility. It increases the eect of
quality reduction of CRI in private school on government payo, decreasing utility. The
net eect is positive if reduction in quality of CRI in the private school is not too large.
In this case, decentralization increases contracting with private schools. Notice that if the
project in the public school is valuable enough for the government then the inequality in
(4) always holds. On the contrary, if the project with public school is not very valuable for
the government and quality reduction of CRI is large enough in both schools, there may
be the case that G > . In this case, contracting with the private school decreases with
decentralization.
To sum up, the equilibrium fraction of the project that the local government assigns
to the private manager is smaller than the optimal fraction. This is so because the local
government does not internalize all the social benet from the QII in the private school.
More important, decentralization aects the fraction of project contracted with the private
manager. If the losses in quality coming from the CRI in the private school are low enough,
more decentralized municipalities contract a larger fraction of the project with the private
school.
Let us now return to the Colombian case. On the one hand, the organization of educa-
tion provision in which municipalities deal with all responsibilities in providing education
(that is the case of certied municipalities) may be associated to a large p in the sense
described in the model. They manage to perceive a large portion of the benets and costs
from contracting with private schools. On the other hand, the government organization in
which municipalities and departments play a role (that is the case of non-certied munici-
palities) may be associated to a smaller p. Benets and costs from contracting with private
schools are shared among non-certied municipalities and departments.
The government G has been rationalized as a municipality government. However, notice
that, for the less decentralized organization, the government G may also be rationalized as
the department. The key point is that the degree of decentralization may aect contracting
with the private sector.
The following hypothesis comes directly from Proposition 4,
H1. Provided that the reduction in quality of the cost reducing innovation is not too
large, more decentralized municipalities contract more enrolment with private schools than
less decentralized municipalities do.
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4 Empirical Strategy
The literature of quasi-experiments allows analysis of the eect of an exogenous change
or treatment when the control group is not random. The challenge of analyzing causality
using any reform as the one explained above is to nd the appropriate control group so
that the eect of the reform can be identied.
I will use a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design to exploit the rule requiring certi-
cation of municipalities over a certain size2. This rule is completely exogenous since it
establishes that all municipalities with 100 thousand inhabitants or more in 2001 must be
certied, i.e. must be in charge of all tasks related to the provision of education. This rule
provides a well-dened cut-o point that produces sharp discontinuities, i.e., treatment is
a discontinuous function of the population size in 2001. The treatment group will be the
more decentralized municipalities (i.e. the certied municipalities) and the control group
will be the less decentralized municipalities (i.e. the non-certied municipalities).
The RD strategy acknowledges that the control and treatment groups might be dierent
on average. However, assuming that other characteristics of municipalities (observable and
non-observable) are continuous at the cuto, any discrete dierence in enrolment between
certied and non-certied municipalities can be attributed to the reform. Therefore, I do
not identify a general eect of the reform on enrolment. I instead try to identify the eect
on enrolment of having a more decentralized system.
Notice that the identifying assumption of continuity of other variables related to enrol-
ment is crucial. To illustrate the point, consider for instance that at the same moment of
the introduction of the reform there is an exogenous shock on prices of private education,
say tuition fees. Moreover, consider that the size of the shock varies discretely between
certied and non-certied municipalities. In this case, any dierence in enrolment could
not be identied as an eect of the reform.
Some other caveats about the approach are in order. Although department and munic-
ipal governments have been subject to the same formal rules, their autonomy with respect
to the national government is far from homogeneous. Historically, Bogota and Antioquia
have been more autonomous than the other regions. They have had better organized ed-
ucation oces than other departments or cities. Therefore, municipalities in Antioquia,
both certied and non-certied, have likely operated in more decentralized systems than
other regions. Moreover, Antioquia implemented an scheme of subsidies to private schools
since the second half of the 1990s3.
Law and decrees that implemented the reform established deadlines for the process of
certication. It is not surprising that some municipalities were certied without having
completed payroll reorganization. At the department level it is important to mention
the case of Choco. This department is the least developed in the country. Unlike the
2See Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) for an overview and Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001)
for a non-parametric presentation.
3This was a special program nanced with a World Bank credit.
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other departments, Choco was not certied under the previous regime. Nevertheless, it
was certied automatically in 2001 without having received the personnel payroll from
the nation. The lack of technical capacity in Choco rendered certication of its capital,
Quibdo, impossible even though it had to be done by law. This caveat implies that in
practice the reform was not carried out as planned. Both delayed implementation and
automatic certication might reduce the eect on enrolment. The size of this downward
bias is dicult to measure.
4.1 Identication
Let Om be an outcome variable of enrolment for municipality m and Cm be the dummy
variable dening the treatment. It is a discontinuous function of population size in 2001,
Cm = 1l(Sm  100000). I will estimate the following equation:
Om = 0 + f(Sm   Scm; Cm) + Cm + "m (5)
where Scm = 100000. The polynomial f(Sm Scm; Cm) should reproduce how the dependent
variable is distributed across the assignment variable (the population in 2001). Theoret-
ically it can be of any order but often it is of lower order. So, if f(Sm   Scm; Cm) is
well specied then  identies the eect of the reform. Reported results are based on the
following specic form of f ,
f(Sm   Scm; Cm) = 1(Sm   Scm) + 2(Sm   Scm)2 (6)
+1((Sm   Scm)  Cm) + 2((Sm   Scm)2  Cm):
Equation (6) allows for interactions between the assignment and the treatment variables
when 1 = 2 6= 0.
I will use two measures of enrolment as an outcome variable. The rst part of the
analysis focuses on Om = Ym = Ypost   Ypre, where Ypost is the number of students in
municipality m in a post-reform year and Ypre is the number of students in municipality m
in a pre-reform year. I perform this exercise for students enroled in public schools. Notice
that, if identifying assumptions hold, the eect of treatment is identied by
E[YmjCm = 1; Sm   Scm = 0]  E[YmjCm = 0; Sm   Scm = 0] = b:
Afterwards, I conduct the same exercise using the number of students subsidized in pri-
vate schools. Since there are no subsidies before the reform, the outcome variable becomes
Om = Y sm;post. If the identifying assumptions hold, the eect of treatment is identied by
E[Y sm;postjCm = 1; Sm   Scm = 0]  E[Y sm;postjCm = 0; Sm   Scm = 0] = b:
Although the law was approved in 2001, it was implemented in 2003. The main part
of the results shown below take 2001 as the pre-reform year in order to account for the
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reform eects in 2002. Indeed, knowing that in the future, transfers will be based on per-
pupil budgets, municipal governments could try to increase enrolment before the law was
implemented.
To check the assumption that, in absence of treatment, the dependent variable should
be continuous at the cuto, I take the increase of enrolment between two pre-reform years,
2000 and 2001, as the dependent variable. Estimations of Equation (5) using this dependent
variable should show no discontinuity. To check the continuity assumption that other
observable variables must be continuous at the cuto, several variables were included, one
by one, as controls in the estimations of enrolment. Among the controls I have tuition fees;
population of school age; municipal taxes per capita; investment in human capital (teacher
training), buildings, materials; measures of poverty, political elections, conict, etc.
I run parametric estimations for each year and calculate robust standard errors. I also
pool the annual samples. Errors are clustered at the municipal level in order to control for
correlations across time in the same municipality. Pooling allows me to obtain estimates
with more precision at the cost of losing the variability of the coecient . It also allows me
to check whether the results are robust to independent errors (see Lee and Card (2008)).
Colombia has more than one thousand municipalities. Only 40 of them were certied
with the reform. To check whether the estimated polynomial is driven by municipalities
beyond the cuto point, I estimate the regressions with interactions as in Equation 5. The
rest of the municipalities are non-certied. Two of the 40 municipalities certied in 2003
are very large with respect to the others (outliers). In the estimations, I use two samples.
A full sample with around 1021 non-certied municipalities and 38 certied municipalities.
A sample dened with a window of 80000 inhabitants above and below the cuto, with
around 340 non-certied municipalities and 18 certied municipalities. Quibdo (the capital
of Choco), the 6 municipalities certied before 20034 and the two outliers5 are excluded
from all estimations.
4.2 Data and descriptive evidence
Data on enrolment comes from DANE (the national statistics oce) and the Ministry of
Education. Every year both private and public schools report information on dierent
variables including enrolment. This information is used by the Ministry of Education to
calculate enrolment rates by sector (public and private) at the municipal level. Data on mu-
nicipal nance comes from a questionnaire gathered annually by the National Department
of Planning. Data on tuition fees come from the questionnaire responded to by secondary
senior students for a national test administered every year.
Although a before-after analysis is not a causal analysis, it gives us an idea of how
enrolment has changed after the reform. Figure 1 shows the number of students in pre-
college education (total and dierent levels), attending either public or private schools in
4Bogota, Barranquilla, Santa Marta, Cartagena, Pasto and Armenia
5Cali and Medelln.
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the last eleven years. There is a slightly increasing trend in total number of students after
the reform. This is the net eect of a trend increase in enrolment in secondary (upper
and lower) and a trend decrease in primary. Besides, trends in gross enrolment rates in
Figure 2 seem to increase after the reform. It reects an increase in the trend of gross
enrolment in secondary and pre-primary that outweighs a decrease in gross enrolment rate
in primary. The decrease in the growth trend of primary enrolment is reected in the Net
Enrolment Rate (NER) { Primary school NER have not risen after the reform (see Table 1).
This reduction in the growth trend of primary enrolment may be due to governments have
concentrated eorts in increasing enrolment in secondary. Since there is a large fraction of
children and youth out of secondary school, it might be easier to enrol pupils in secondary
than in primary. Indeed, in 2001, school-age children out secondary school amounted to
almost 50% of school-age children, while school-age children out primary school amounted
to 13% (see Table 1).
Table 2 shows some characteristics of certied and non-certied municipalities. In
1993, 45% of households in non-certied municipalities and 31% of households in certied
municipalities were poor, on average. Regarding variables on conict, we see that the
conict intensity has decreased between 2000 and 2005. Both types of municipalities receive
a similar number of displaced people per thousand inhabitants. However, displaced people
are more often expelled from non-certied municipalities. Regarding taxes on industry and
commerce, certied municipalities collect 31 thousand pesos per capita (15 dollars) while
non-certied municipalities collect 23 thousand pesos (11 dollars), on average.
The reform aects the municipal spending per capita, transfers to municipalities per
capita and the proportion of municipal income made up of transfers. Before the reform 45%
of municipal income in certied municipalities was transfers. After the reform it amounted
to 63%. Similarly, transfers to certied municipalities were about 85 thousand pesos per
capita in 2000 and rose to about 246 thousand pesos per capita in 2005. On the other hand,
transfers have represented around 60% of municipal income in non-certied municipalities,
and transfers have been around 135 thousand pesos per capita, both before and after the
reform. In Figure 3, we have transfers per capita just before and after the reform was
implemented. Population in 2001 has been normalized around the cuto of 100 thousand
inhabitants. In 2002, transfers per capita for the municipalities around the cuto amounted
to 110 thousand pesos. At the cuto, there is no visible dierence between certied and
non-certied municipalities in that year. In contrast, in 2003, non-certied municipalities
received a similar amount as in 2002, while certied municipalities received a bit more of
the double of the transfers received by non-certied municipalities (around 260 thousand
pesos).
The number of pupils enrolled in public and private schools as a fraction of school-age
children appears in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Pre-college enrolment in public schools
from non-certied municipalities is 73.44% of school-age children in 2001, on average. It
increases to 81.69% in 2005. In certied municipalities, this fraction is about 67.84%
in 2001, on average, and rises up to 75.75% in 2005. Notice that the number of pupils
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enrolled in primary is larger than the number of school-age children. In both types of
municipalities, around 60% of these students are undertaking primary studies, 25% are
following lower secondary courses, 8% are in upper secondary and 7% in pre-primary.
Pre-college enrolment in private schools from non-certied municipalities represents 7.19%
of school age children in 2001, on average. It decreases to 6.96% in 2005. In certied
municipalities, enrolment in private schools also decreases from 17.75% to 17.31% of school
age students in the same period.
Finally, the number of subsidized pupils in private schools as a fraction of school-age
children appears in tables 5 and 6. On the one hand, non-certied municipalities subsidized
1.29% of school-age children in 2003, on average. This fraction remains relatively stable
until 2005. Most of the subsidized students are attending either primary or lower secondary
school, which is reected in the fraction of school-age children (1.32% for primary and 1.67%
for lower secondary in 2003). On the other hand, certied municipalities subsidized 1.73%
of school-age children in 2003, on average. This fraction rises to 3.42% in 2005. As in non-
certied municipalities, most subsidized students are in primary or lower secondary school.
But, the number of subsidized pupils in pre-primary school represents the largest fraction
of school-age children (4.75%) in 2005. As was mentioned previously, the department
of Antioquia had developed a subsidy program before the 2001 reform. Notice that the
largest fraction of school-age children subsidized in private schools in the non-certied
municipalities is larger than anyone in the certied municipalities. Table 6 shows fractions
calculated excluding the municipalities in Antioquia. The maximum fractions subsidized
in private schools of non-certied municipalities decreases a lot. This suggests that non-
certied municipalities in Antioquia subsidize a large number of students, which may be a
consequence of the subsidy scheme implemented in Antioquia before the reform.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Eects on enrolment
Since the 2001 reform establishes a subsidy scheme that regional and local governments
can use to enrol pupils in private schools, decentralization may have aected enrolment in
both public and private schools. Throughout this section, we will assume the identifying
assumptions hold. In the next section, we will verify those assumptions.
Let me rst consider the eect in public schools. The dependent variable is the increase
in the number of pupils between a post-reform year and 2001. I look for dierences between
more and less decentralized municipalities, i.e. certied and non-certied municipalities,
respectively.
The results show that there is almost no enrolment eect in public schools (See Tables
7 and 8). I estimate Equation (5) for each post-reform year (2002 - 2006), each level of
schooling (pre-primary, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary) and all pre-college edu-
cation. Table 7 reports the estimations of coecient  of equation (5). The quadratic form
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of this equation reproduces relatively well the distribution of enrolment across population
size (see Figure 4). There are few signicant eects. In 2002, the certied municipalities
enroled 212 more students in upper secondary than did the non-certied municipalities.
This number is the mean treatment eect over all municipalities evaluated at the treat-
ment cuto. This dierence represents around 6.5% of the 16-17 year-old population and
12% of upper-secondary students in public schools in 2002 for the municipalities nearest to
the cuto on both sides. Since the law approved in 2001 was implemented starting in 2003,
the dierence may be interpreted as the more decentralized municipalities' anticipation of
the reform's implementation. Indeed, since 2001 all municipalities knew that from 2003
onwards a national transfer will be assigned according to the number of pupils. Both types
of municipalities had incentives to enrol more students in 2002 because of the national
transfer to be paid at the beginning of 2003 was based on 2002 enrolment. The results
show that more decentralized municipalities were more successful in increasing the number
of pupils in upper secondary than the less decentralized municipalities.
In addition, non-certied municipalities seem to have a larger increase in the number of
pupils in pre-primary in 2005 (774 students) and in primary in 2006 (1672 students). How-
ever, these dierences disappear once controls for department xed eects are introduced
(see Table 8). These xed eects account for institutional dierences among departments
that cannot be attributed to the reform.
The dierence in upper secondary mentioned above does not disappear with the de-
partment xed eects (see the fourth line in Table 8). I further check the robustness of this
result with dierent specications of the model. These specications dier from each other
in the polynomial of the assignment variable. Both the quadratic and the linear polyno-
mials with and without interactions between the assignment and the treatment variables
are estimated. The rst panel in Table 9 shows the results for upper secondary in 2002.
The coecients of the quadratic polynomial with interactions seems to be non signicant
(Model 1). Besides, the dierence in upper secondary in 2002 is not robust to dierent spec-
ications. Neither are the dierences found in the number of pupils enroled in pre-primary
and primary levels that are mentioned above (see Panels 1 and 2 in Table 9). Although
the RDD methodology only provides evidence at the treatment cuto, comparing how data
is distributed at each side of the cuto along all the sample also helps to see why there
are no dierences in public school enrolment. Figure 4 shows that observed data have no
important dierences in the dependent variable's support.
In conclusion, if there is any dierence in the number of pupils enroled in public schools
between more and less decentralized municipalities, the dierence is temporary (lasts one
year{ 2002) and is present only in the number of pupils enroled in the upper secondary
school.
Let me now look at the eect of decentralization on subsidized enrolment in private
schools. Since there is no subsidized enrolment before the reform implementation6, the de-
6As stated in the second section, the municipalities from the department of Antioquia subsidized some
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pendent variable is not the increase but the number of pupils subsidized in private schools
in each year after implementation (2003 - 2006). Once again, I look for dierences between
more and less decentralized municipalities, i.e. certied and non-certied municipalities, re-
spectively. Under the identifying assumptions, estimates of  estimate the mean treatment
eect evaluated at the treatment cuto, which is the treatment eect of interest.
I estimate the six specications already shown in Table 9 for each level of school in
the study, for each year. To illustrate this, Table 10 shows the estimates of the polyno-
mials' coecients and the Certication Dummy's coecient for 2005. Each panel of the
Table shows the results for each level of education. The coecient of the Certication
Dummy, , estimates the dierence in the number of subsidized pupils among both types
of municipalities. All the estimates of  are statistically signicant and robust to dierent
specications. This result provides evidence that more decentralized municipalities have
subsidized more pupils in private schools than less decentralized municipalities have done.
The estimates of  of Model 4 of Table 10 for all school levels and years are summarized
in Table 11. It shows that the treatment has an eect on the number of pupils subsidized
in private schools for all school levels in the period 2004 - 2006. The largest dierences
were in 2005. In that year, the more decentralized municipalities subsidized 833 students
more than did the less decentralized municipalities. At the cuto, it represents around
20% of the number of pupils in private schools and 3% of the population of school age.
These students are distributed in pre-primary (97 students), primary (430 students), lower
secondary (253 students) and upper secondary (53 students). In pre-primary, the dierence
represents around 22% of pupils enroled at that level in private schools and 4% of the 6-
year-old population. In primary, the dierence represents around 30% of pupils at that
level in private schools and 3.4% of the 7-6-year-old population. In lower secondary, the
dierence amounts to about 20% of pupils at that level in private schools and 2.8% of the
12-15-year-old population. Finally, in upper secondary the dierence goes up to 7.5% of
pupils in upper-secondary private schools and 1.3% of the 16-17-year-old population. The
estimates with linear interactions and the observed data for 2005 are depicted in Figure 5.
Since the mean treatment eect is estimated at the treatment cuto, the estimates
may be biased by the observations far from the cuto in both directions, that is, by data
from the smallest and the largest municipalities included in the sample. To check for
any bias of this type, I restrict the sample to the municipalities in the window of  80
thousand inhabitants around the treatment cuto. The estimates of the treatment eect
are summarized in (Table 12). It shows that the treatment eects are still signicant for
all the school levels in 2005 and 2006.
In conclusion, there is evidence showing that more decentralized municipalities subsi-
dized more pupils studying in private schools than did less decentralized municipalities.
The dierence in subsidized pupils is signicant for all school levels aected by the reform
and, at least, for 2005 and 2006.
pupils in private schools before 2003. All the municipalities from Antioquia are excluded from regressions.
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5.2 Continuity checks and Robustness
Let me rst have a look at how results are aected by using dierent samples. In particular,
I want to compare the results obtained with and without the municipalities of Antioquia,
the department that implemented subsidy contracts before the reform. The comparison
appears in Table 13. It presents the dierence between certied and non-certied mu-
nicipalities in the number of subsidized pupils in private schools for 2005 by school level.
Columns (1) and (2) show the results tting the model using the full sample with and with-
out the municipalities in Antioquia, respectively. Columns (3)-(4) show the results using
the small sample with and without the municipalities in Antioquia, respectively. First, no-
tice that all estimates of  are statistically signicant for the four samples. Second, remark
that, as expected, including the municipalities in Antioquia bias downwards the eect of
decentralization. This is true for the full and the small samples and for all school levels
except for pre-primary, which is bias upwards.
Findings in the previous section are valid if the identifying assumptions hold. In the
rst place, in absence of treatment, the number of pupils in public and private schools must
be continuous at the treatment cut-o. If so, any discontinuity in presence of treatment
can be attributed to the treatment itself. Table 14 reports the estimates of  using the
increase in the number of pupils between 2000 and 2001 as the dependent variable. The
estimates correspond to the specications of Models 1 - 5 of Table 9. A signicant estimate
of  would reveal the existence of discontinuities at the treatment cuto before the treat-
ment occurs. Any discontinuity would threaten the identication of the treatment eect.
Table 14 shows that there are no discontinuities at the treatment cuto for all levels of
education and specications for both public and private schools. This provides evidence
that supports the claim that the discontinuities found in the previous section are caused
by the decentralization reform.
Moreover, Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) show that the RD design should be applied
with caution in settings where parents have signicant school choice and schools are free to
set prices. In this case, there may be discontinuities that are not caused by the treatment.
The authors illustrate the issue using data from Chile, a country in which there is a widely
spread voucher system. Although I do not use data at the level of households, it is worth
saying that Colombian households do not have such a school choice because there is no a
substantial voucher system7 and big cities, the places in which school choice is more likely,
are excluded from all regressions. Besides, prices of private schools are regulated since the
early nineties, so that competition on prices is limited. However, nothing of this prevents
discontinuities in prices across municipalities. To check discontinuities in prices I use data
on tuition fees reported by senior secondary students each year as a proxy of tuition fees of
all pre-college schools. Table 15 reports estimates of  using tuition fees as the dependent
7The largest voucher program in Colombia, the PACES program, assigned 125000 vouchers in mid-
nineties. It amounts to less than 2% of the overall enrolment. See Angrist et al. (2002) and Angrist et al.
(2006) for an evaluation of the PACES program.
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variable. It shows no discontinuities in tuition fees in either public or private schools for
all years in the period of study. The absence of discontinuities in the pre-treatment years
means the continuity assumption holds for tuition fees. The absence of discontinuities in
the post-treatment provides evidence that supports the idea that the reform's eect on the
increase of pupils do not pass through tuition fees.
Another crucial variable to check is the structure of population. Discontinuities in the
population of school age at the cuto may cause discontinuities in the number of pupils.
If they exist, it may be the case that the dierence in the number of pupils across types
are explained not because more decentralized municipalities do better but because they
have more population of school age. To check for these discontinuities I estimate the same
models as before using the number of inhabitants of school age corresponding to each
school level as the dependent variable. Estimates of  with the specication of Model 4 of
Table 9 for all years are summarized in Table 16. They show no dierence between more
decentralized and less decentralized municipalities at the cuto regarding their population
of school age (See Figure 6).
In general, I should check whether all other observable and non-observable characteris-
tics of municipalities aecting enrolment are continuous at the treatment cuto. Of course,
continuity of most of non-observable variables will remain as assumption. But, all observ-
able variables must be checked. There are two alternatives to check continuity: either
one estimates Equation (5) using those variables as dependent variables or one adds those
variables, one by one, to the regressions of the previous section.
New regressions of the number of subsidized pupils controlling for the observable vari-
ables were done. Table 17 shows the results for 20058. Column (1) reports again the
treatment eect from Model 4 in the last panel of Table 10{ the baseline estimation. Col-
umn (2) shows the treatment eect once one controls for department xed eects. Although
the treatment eect decreases a little bit, it is signicant. The other columns control by
some measure of poverty. Column (3) shows that the proportion of poor population does
not aect the number of subsidized pupils. Columns (4)-(6) show the eect of the number
of people targeted for welfare programs. In Colombia, there is an index implemented to
target poor people for welfare programs. This index, the SISBEN index, denes some levels
of welfare, that I call WELFARE (level 1 to level 3). Column (4) shows that the number of
subsidized pupils decreases with the population in WELFARE-1 (the poorest people) and
Column (6) shows that it increases with the population in WELFARE-3 (not so poor).
The second panel of Table 17 shows the treatment eects controlling by municipal
budget variables, like tax income per capita, transfers per capita, municipal education
spending per capita and transfer dependence (Transfers/Total income). It also reports the
eect of tuition fees. Education spending per capita (Column (3)) and transfers per capita
(Column (4)) have a positive eect on the number of subsidized pupils. The eect is small
and signicant at the 90% level of condence.
8These exercises were also performed for the other years. The results are similar.
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The third panel of Table 17 shows the treatment eect controlled with other municipal
variables. The eect of municipal bankruptcy appears in column (1). Columns (2)-(6) show
the eect of other spending variables. Indeed, Drazen and Eslava (2010) nd that politicians
may use some expenditures to target voters in pre-electoral periods. In particular, they
nd, using Colombian data, that politicians may increase current spending (bureaucracy)
and some investment expenditures like recreation, housing and health in order to attract
voters. None of these variables are signicant.
The fourth panel of Table 17 shows the treatment eect controlled by other variables
of education investment by municipalities, including (lagged) proportion of investment in
new infrastructure, maintenance of infrastructure, material and equipment, training of
teachers, non-earmarked transfers per capita spent on education and own resources spent
on education. None of these variables are signicant.
The fth panel of Table 17 shows conict variables like forcibly displaced population
(expelled and received people), killings in attacks or combats by illegal armies and number
of attacks and combats by dierent illegal armies. The guerrilla attacks have a signicant
negative inuence on subsidized enrolment, as do the attacks of illegal armies combined.
All the other variables have no eect.
The last panel of the same Table shows political variables. Indeed, part of the eects
of decentralization may arise from political grounds. The Same-Party dummy is a dummy
equal to one if the department governor and the municipal mayor belong to the same
party. I also include a dummy for the main political parties in Colombia (the Liberal and
the Conservative), the percentage of winning votes in elections and the voter turnout. All
these variables have no eect on the number of subsidized pupils.
In conclusion, the treatment eect is robust to many dierent kinds of observable vari-
ables.
As observed in Figures 4 and 5 there is very large variation in the certied municipali-
ties. This is so because of the small number of certied municipalities. I have dealt with the
lopsided sample introducing interactions between the assignment and the treatment vari-
ables. To gain additional precision in the estimation of , I pool the sample for the period
2003-2006 . The cost of doing so is that I lose the yearly variability of the coecient. The
estimates provide the average number of subsidized pupils in the period 2003 - 2006. Table
18 shows the results for each specication. The average dierence in subsidized enrolment
among certied and non-certied municipalities amounts to 541 students. All schooling
levels have signicant dierences. The pooled sample is also useful to check for robustness
to specication error. Following Lee and Card (2008), the literature usually deals with this
problem by clustering errors by each observation of population (municipalities), as I have
done. The authors show that clustering is useful when the specication error is identical.
However, when the specication error is independent we need to inate standard error even
more to account for dierent errors. Following the procedure in Lee and Card (2008), I
estimate the robust condence intervals. With identical specication error the condence
intervals come from the standard error of running the regression with the micro data clus-
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tered by municipalities. The inated variance with independent specication error comes
from estimations on the collapsed data at the cell level. Notice that the condence interval
with 95% level of signicance for independent standard error is wider than the interval for
identical standard error. The treatment eect survives for all levels and the total except
for upper secondary.
6 Discussion
The reform established two ways for regional and local governments to increase enrolment:
either enrol more students in public schools or subsidize pupils through contracts with
private schools. Why is it that the more decentralized municipalities subsidize more pupils
in private schools than less decentralized municipalities? Why isn't there a dierence
between the two types of municipalities in the increase in pupils enroled in public schools?
Let me discuss the rst question. Once the reform is launched, the easiest way for
governments to increase enrolment is to put more children in public schools. In Colombia
there is no cap on the number of pupils per teacher. So, the governments, subject to the
technological constraints (i.e. the size of classrooms), can establish any cap level they wish.
However, at some point in time, the seats in the public schools will be completely full. At
that point the governments must decide: either they contract private schools or they build
new public schools. How might decentralization aect this decision?
Contracting with private schools increases the number of children and youth attending
school. This provides benets to the local governments, which may take the form of
political or economic rents. Indeed, increasing enrolment may improve the chances for the
incumbent political party to stay in power or for an incumbent politician to be promoted to
more important positions. There may also be economic rents. There is anecdotal evidence
that contracts with private schools are signed at a lower price than the transfer per pupil
received by the certied government, so the government may save money by contracting
with private schools.
One important point here is that the certied municipalities can deal directly with
private schools, while the others must do so through the department. The less decentralized
municipalities have to negotiate the subsidy contracts with departments, which means that
they split the benets of contracting private schools among them. That is, under the less
decentralized organization, governments have fewer incentives to contract with private
schools.
In addition, recall that the number of children and youth out of school is quite large.
They belong to poor households and probably have less ability than children already in
school. Since citizens not only care about enrolment but also about quality of education,
the more decentralized municipalities may be more accountable on this issue. Enroling all
the children out of school in public schools may deteriorate their average quality. Therefore,
it is more benecial for local governments to enrol them in private schools for at least two
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reasons. First, because it reduces quality deterioration in public schools. Second, because
private schools are both more accountable to parents and less likely to be controlled by
interest groups like teachers' unions.
There may also be alternative explanations. For instance, are the departments more
likely to be captured by groups that dislike private providers? The national teachers' union
is likely the only group able to do so. I would say that this union is more able to con-
trol the lower levels of government, as departments have more negotiation power with the
union than the municipalities. However, it is likely that the union provides more votes in
department elections than the very small municipalities. Our results are robust to several
political variables, including pork-barrel expenditures and several measures on voting re-
sults. An investigation comparing the smallest and the largest non-certied municipalities
would provide insights on this issue9.
Let me now discuss the second question. In a context in which there are no dierences
in taxes and national transfers are earmarked, it seems that dierences in the level of
public school enrolment across more and less decentralized municipalities have to do with
dierences in credit constraints to nance the construction of new schools. More and
less decentralized municipalities have no dierences regarding the portion of expenditures
spent on new infrastructure nor the portion of own resources spent in education. It seems as
well, that the problem not only has to do with constraints on the supply side but also with
constraints on the demand side. The econometric exercises show that subsidized enrolment
decreases with extreme poverty. This can be explained because the poorest households may
require additional programs (food-for-school, transport subsidies, etc.) to aord to send
their children to school. Why municipalities and departments do not have this type of
programs is a question that deserves to be answered.
7 Concluding remarks
The degree of decentralization of the government aects the amount of contracting with
the private sector. I have developed a model of incomplete contracts that shows that, in
equilibrium, governments contract the private sector less than the optimal level. I also
show that decentralization makes the government to choose contracting levels nearer to
the optimal.
The empirical part uses the decentralization reform implemented in Colombia in 2001.
Results suggest that more decentralized municipalities have subsidized more students in
private schools. The dierence amounts to 20% of enrolment in private schools and 3%
of the school-age population. This fraction represents almost one fth of children and
youth that were out school in 2001. This result is robust to a number of controls including
9Seabright (1996) makes a theoretical analysis of how groups that are not decisive in the elections of
governments of local jurisdictions can become decisive in the elections of governments of regional or national
jurisdictions.
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political election variables, expenditures related to political pandering, internal conict and
poverty.
Given the nature of the empirical approach (RDD), validity of my results is local.
Issues as strong capacity constraints or capture by control groups (illegal armies, landlords,
unions, etc.) are more likely in smaller municipalities than those dened by the population
cut-o utilized in the empirical exercise. Exploring how these issues may interact with our
ndings is left for future research.
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Appendix
Table 1: Net Enrolment Rate
School Level 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Pre-Primary 52.1 54.6 60.7 56.9 58.8
Primary 87.1 87.2 86.4 86.2 86.5
Secondary 52.1 53.0 54.4 57.6 59.5
Total 79.5 80.4 81.2 83.3 84.3
Table 2: Means for Certied and Non-Certied Municipalities, 2000 and 2005
2000 2005
Certied Non-Certied Total Certied Non-Certied Total
Mun. Mun. Mun. Mun.
Population in 2001 135018 37755 42604 135018 37755 42604
Proportion of Poor in 1993 (%) 31.17 45.26 38.21 31.17 45.26 38.21
Forcibly Displacement:
Expelled Population 2.8 15.1 14.5 1.9 7.7 7.4
Received Population 8.9 8.2 8.2 3.3 4.4 4.3
Industry-Commerce Tax per capita 30.96 23.19 27.29 32.20 23.35 27.77
Education Spending per capita 26.53 32.90 29.59 161.65 27.78 93.87
Transfers per capita 85.02 133.01 107.72 246.77 136.34 191.56
Transfer Dependence (%) 45 62 53 63 57 60
Note.{ The population in 2001 for certied municipalities is calculated taking the information of municipalities with population
between 100 thousand inhabitants and 180 thousand inhabitants. The population in 2001 for non-certied municipalities is calculated
taking the information of municipalities with population between 20 thousand inhabitants and 100 thousand inhabitants. The
proportion of poor corresponds to data of 1993. Expelled Population and Received Population are measured as the number of persons
per 1000 inhabitants. Industry-Commerce Tax per capita, Education Spending per capita and Transfers per capita are measured
in thousand pesos per inhabitant (constant prices of 2004). Education Spending per capita is the money spent by the municipal
government in education. Transfers per capita and Transfer dependence include both National and Department transfers.
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Table 3: Fraction of School-Age Children Enrolled in Public schools for Certied and Non-Certied
Municipalities (%)
Non-Certied Municipalities Certied Municipalities
Year School Level Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
2001
Pre-primary 52.4 23.85 3.78 135.35
Primary 107.42 28.82 25.37 241.75
Lower Secondary 52.17 20.13 7.72 103.01
Upper Secondary 33.7 17.12 0 109.24
Total 73.44 18.24 14.91 139.95
Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
55.93 10.51 38.73 73.89
89.93 22.96 60.73 150.13
57.07 13.25 34.85 84.57
36.92 11.16 20.42 69.96
67.84 14.61 44.15 100.57
2005
Pre-primary 79.05 39.46 7.46 330.95
Primary 106.33 29.94 25.42 196.54
Lower Secondary 66.45 23.96 9.22 155.81
Upper Secondary 44.72 20.31 2.99 104.7
Total 81.69 21.99 17.65 150.23
74.35 27.91 43.01 154.82
92.08 25.72 62.13 154.56
67.38 11.56 49.7 86.52
49.4 11.67 33.13 79.26
75.75 15.4 52.57 109.7
Note.{ Statistics for non-certied municipalities are calculated with data of the 343 municipalities whose
population was between 20 thousand inhabitants and 100 thousand inhabitants in 2001. Statistics for
certied municipalities are calculated with data of the 18 municipalities whose population was between
100 thousand inhabitants and 180 thousand inhabitants.
Table 4: Fraction of School-Age Children Enrolled in Private schools for Certied and Non-Certied
Municipalities (%)
Non-Certied Municipalities Certied Municipalities
Year School Level Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
2001
Pre-primary 6.53 9.98 0 82.23
Primary 7.93 10.9 0 80.05
Lower Secondary 6.91 11.47 0 101.86
Upper Secondary 6.10 10.83 0 103.36
Total 7.19 10.32 0 80.14
Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
19.77 12.77 2.9 52.86
19.33 11.25 3.71 48.49
16.4 12.3 2.93 49.47
15.17 10.86 3.25 44.58
17.75 11.12 4.44 48.54
2005
Pre-primary 7.2 11.77 0 86.59
Primary 7.01 11.87 0 83.84
Lower Secondary 7.07 11.59 0 76.59
Upper Secondary 6.35 14.2 0 191.43
Total 6.96 11.21 0 78.92
21.8 13.6 1.01 45.76
17.42 10.76 1.12 42.3
16.39 13.89 2.66 57.56
16.44 13.04 2.31 53.4
17.31 11.83 2.57 49.3
Note.{ Statistics for non-certied municipalities are calculated with data of the 343 municipalities whose
population was between 20 thousand inhabitants and 100 thousand inhabitants in 2001. Statistics for
certied municipalities are calculated with data of the 18 municipalities whose population was between
100 thousand inhabitants and 180 thousand inhabitants.
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Table 5: Fraction of School-Age Children Subsidized in Private Schools, 2003 - 2005 (%)
Non-Certied Municipalities Certied Municipalities
Year School Level Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
2003
Pre-primary 0.67 3.01 0 27.67
Primary 1.32 5.75 0 50.83
Lower Secondary 1.67 4.56 0 31.73
Upper Secondary 0.62 2.21 0 23.08
Total 1.29 3.98 0 31.73
Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
1.85 3.54 0 11.64
1.84 4.01 0 14.9
1.81 3.67 0 13.87
1.17 2.48 0 8.66
1.73 3.46 0 13.22
2004
Pre-primary 1.01 5.26 0 53.52
Primary 1.31 5.27 0 43.02
Lower Secondary 1.43 3.7 0 30.53
Upper Secondary 0.52 1.76 0 18.28
Total 1.22 3.6 0 26.16
3.16 6 0 24.87
1.99 2.63 0 9.09
1.89 2.56 0 8.91
1.03 2.46 0 8.65
1.92 2.24 0 6.8
2005
Pre-primary 0.78 3.35 0 34.18
Primary 1.38 5.79 0 47.96
Lower Secondary 1.68 4.13 0 28.34
Upper Secondary 0.56 1.83 0 20.62
Total 1.33 3.84 0 29.78
4.75 6.23 0 22.55
3.93 4.89 0 15.64
3.19 3.97 0 14.47
1.71 2.71 0 9.41
3.42 3.86 0 13.95
Note.{ Statistics for non-certied municipalities are calculated with data of the 343 municipalities whose
population was between 20 thousand inhabitants and 100 thousand inhabitants in 2001. Statistics for certied
municipalities are calculated with data of the 18 municipalities whose population was between 100 thousand
inhabitants and 180 thousand inhabitants.
Table 6: Fraction of School-Age Children Subsidized in Private Schools excluding Antioquia(%)
Non-Certied Municipalities Certied Municipalities
Year School Level Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
2003
Pre-primary 0.09 0.56 0 4.45
Primary 0.1 0.58 0 4.38
Lower Secondary 0.23 1.22 0 11.12
Upper Secondary 0.13 0.88 0 9.15
Total 0.15 0.76 0 6.81
Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
1.4 3.23 0 11.64
1.54 3.9 0 14.9
1.68 3.84 0 13.87
1.06 2.55 0 8.66
1.49 3.58 0 13.22
2004
Pre-primary 0.4 3.4 0 53.52
Primary 0.31 1.46 0 15.98
Lower Secondary 0.64 1.97 0 12.41
Upper Secondary 0.28 1.05 0 10.93
Total 0.42 1.26 0 9.70
2.01 2.71 0 6.36
1.65 2.04 0 5.48
1.67 2.47 0 8.91
0.58 1.66 0 6.67
1.52 1.95 0 6.8
2005
Pre-primary 0.28 1.59 0 17.65
Primary 0.24 1.46 0 16.78
Lower Secondary 0.58 1.97 0 18.59
Upper Secondary 0.2 0.85 0 7.28
Total 0.35 1.25 0 12.21
4.45 6.31 0 22.55
3.73 4.81 0 15.64
3.16 4.18 0 14.47
1.62 2.78 0 9.41
3.27 4.02 0 13.95
Note.{ Municipalities in Antioquia are excluded. Statistics for non-certied municipalities are calculated with data
of the 296 municipalities whose population was between 20 thousand inhabitants and 100 thousand inhabitants in
2001. Statistics for certied municipalities are calculated with data of the 16 municipalities whose population was
between 100 thousand inhabitants and 180 thousand inhabitants.
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Table 7: Dierence between Certied and Non-Certied Municipalities in the Increase of Pupils in
Public Schools
School Level 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Pre-primary -109.023 -76.590 19.085 -773.753 -749.201
(120.631) (319.882) (312.283) (442.816) (501.842)
Primary -261.948 -419.572 39.518 -871.942 -1671.956
(397.362) (918.906) (1102.779) (1103.677) (995.589)
Lower Secondary 469.015 -53.220 532.000 475.174 417.533
(317.181) (488.411) (534.198) (691.066) (643.807)
Upper Secondary 211.967 138.477 166.175 241.353 -76.674
(110.358) (157.117) (218.227) (262.423) (191.354)
Total 310.010 -410.904 756.778 -929.167 -2080.298
(656.444) (1566.482) (1841.266) (2013.452) (1980.567)
Note.{ Estimates of the certication dummy's coecient (). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are calculated
using the quadratic polynomial with interactions (Equation (5) in the text). The dependent variable is the dierence between the
year of the study and 2001 of the number of pupils. Municipalities in Antioquia are excluded from estimations.
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
29
Table 8: Dierence between Certied and Non-Certied Municipalities in the Increase of
Pupils in Public Schools (with Department Fixed Eects)
School Level 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Pre-primary -72.276 107.927 226.282 -439.943 -390.957
(113.707) (278.088) (272.859) (348.016) (368.240)
Primary -108.748 -93.733 491.126 -315.274 -957.898
(364.301) (991.381) (1147.510) (1152.775) (896.237)
Lower Secondary 402.734 -68.886 590.216 511.221 497.411
(274.839) (460.804) (467.079) (689.114) (611.923)
Upper Secondary 200.649 125.245 122.920 257.157 -85.873
(102.591) (148.347) (218.209) (244.806) (171.491)
Total 422.359 70.552 1430.543 13.160 -937.318
(609.987) (1521.140) (1745.298) (1951.855) (1718.622)
Note.{ Estimates of the certication dummy's coecient (). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are calculated
using the quadratic polynomial with interactions (Equation (5) in the text). All models include a dummy variable for each
department. The dependent variable is the dierence between the year of the study and 2001 in the number of pupils. Municipalities
in Antioquia are excluded from estimations.
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
Table 9: Dierence between Certied and Non-Certied Munici-
palities in the Increase of Pupils in Public Schools (Robustness to
dierent specications)
Upper Secondary 2002 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .004 .002 .004 .0006 .001 .001
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.001) (.0006) (.0006)
(Population)2 2.36e-08 8.65e-09 3.16e-08 -6.14e-09
(2.69e-08) (2.56e-08) (2.56e-08) (9.60e-09)
Certication Dummy 211.967 8.463 67.385 49.492 88.456 14.052
(110.358) (131.757) (86.165) (94.637) (82.348) (74.490)
Population*Certication -.016 -.008 -.003
(.006) (.005) (.002)
(Population)2*Certication 1.19e-07 -3.84e-08
(7.83e-08) (6.33e-08)
Constant 153.513 121.787 168.348 92.563 110.106 99.321
(80.982) (77.987) (78.259) (44.829) (43.731) (41.979)
N 361 361 361 361 361 361
r2 .092 .07 .084 .068 .075 .066
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Table 9 Continued...
Pre-Primary 2005 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .006 .010 .003 .007 .005 .005
(.006) (.006) (.007) (.005) (.001) (.001)
(Population)2 1.36e-08 4.69e-08 -1.40e-08 2.51e-08
(5.54e-08) (5.99e-08) (6.17e-08) (4.86e-08)
Certication Dummy -773.753 -320.139 -278.277 -259.736 -287.627 -114.800
(442.816) (291.807) (346.589) (347.671) (326.593) (231.897)
Population*Certication .037 .009 .006
(.036) (.013) (.010)
(Population)2*Certication -4.06e-07 -5.65e-08
(4.62e-07) (2.03e-07)
Constant 550.29 621.01 499.45 577.99 525.30 550.35
(151.41) (156.96) (158.41) (118.36) (79.18) (84.48)
N 361 361 361 361 361 361
r2 .141 .128 .129 .127 .129 .123
Primary 2006 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .030 .033 .024 .015 .012 .012
(.017) (.017) (.018) (.010) (.004) (.004)
(Population)2 1.83e-07 2.17e-07 1.26e-07 2.76e-08
(1.63e-07) (1.62e-07) (1.68e-07) (9.62e-08)
Certication Dummy -1671.956 -1210.921 -638.520 -684.964 -554.849 -525.823
(995.589) (774.649) (792.142) (805.412) (741.531) (580.491)
Population*Certication .037 -.021 .001
(.076) (.033) (.018)
(Population)2 -8.47e-07 -4.92e-07
(9.57e-07) (4.51e-07)
Constant 1244.24 1316.12 1138.21 941.49 906.94 911.15
(432.29) (424.03) (438.07) (291.48) (254.43) (250.55)
N 361 361 361 361 361 361
r2 .067 .065 .061 .06 .059 .059
Note.{ Estimates of the certication dummy's coecient () and the polynomial's coecients. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. The dependent variable is the dierence between the year of the study and 2001 in the number of pupils in the
corresponding school level. Population is the number of inhabitants of municipalities in 2001. Municipalities in Antioquia are
excluded from estimations.
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
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Table 10: Dierence between Certied and Non-Certied Munic-
ipalities in the Number of Subsidized Pupils in Private Schools,
2005 (Robustness to dierent specications)
Pre-Primary Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population -.00003 .0003 .00004 .00008 .00006
(.00008) (.0003) (.00009) (.00003) (.0001)
(Population)2 -8.00e-10 2.15e-09 1.18e-10
(7.12e-10) (2.58e-09) (5.38e-10)
Certication Dummy 131.780 118.661 97.343 97.121 96.744 107.633
(71.773) (62.829) (43.341) (47.413) (44.985) (27.909)
Population*Certication -.0007 -.001 -.00003
(.001) (.001) (.0003)
(Population)2*Certication 3.17e-09
(2.84e-09)
Constant 4.353 14.503 3.752 7.111 5.643 1.021
(2.703) (9.338) (5.891) (2.756) (11.560) (.313)
N 926 926 926 926 926 926
r2 .345 .343 .329 .328 .328 .326
Primary Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .00003 -.0002 .00004 .0003 -.0002
(.0003) (.001) (.0003) (.00009) (.0005)
(Population)2 -1.74e-09 -3.72e-09 -2.01e-09
(2.41e-09) (8.09e-09) (1.32e-09)
Certication Dummy 384.255 393.053 411.080 430.392 421.215 385.288
(224.640) (195.082) (129.858) (140.581) (134.838) (98.638)
Population*Certication .0007 .0009 -.0008
(.004) (.004) (.0009)
(Population)2*Certication -2.12e-09
(9.02e-09)
Constant 18.093 11.287 20.378 24.101 -11.655 3.597
(11.908) (29.054) (20.703) (8.328) (39.400) (.982)
N 926 926 926 926 926 926
r2 .353 .353 .352 .349 .34 .338
Lower Secondary Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .001 .0001 .00007 .0003 -.00009
(.0008) (.0006) (.0002) (.0001) (.0003)
(Population)2 7.54e-09 -9.43e-10 -1.46e-09
(5.30e-09) (4.46e-09) (7.77e-10)
Certication Dummy 205.621 243.404 237.957 252.869 245.341 227.293
(124.701) (109.474) (83.986) (90.185) (87.518) (60.308)
Population*Certication -.001 -.0003 -.0007
(.002) (.002) (.0005)
(Population)2*Certication -9.12e-09
(7.12e-09)
Constant 61.207 31.976 29.229 35.224 5.892 13.553
(26.322) (19.670) (13.784) (11.493) (21.237) (1.538)
N 926 926 926 926 926 926
r2 .246 .244 .243 .243 .231 .23
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Table 10 Continued...
Upper Secondary Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .0002 -.0002 .00009 .00006 .00009
(.0002) (.0002) (.0001) (.00003) (.0002)
(Population)2 1.14e-09 -1.75e-09 -3.58e-11
(1.15e-09) (1.84e-09) (5.50e-10)
Certication Dummy 22.651 35.532 53.599 53.139 53.780 71.158
(44.904) (38.669) (26.543) (30.100) (28.038) (25.803)
Population*Certication .0006 .0009 .00006
(.0009) (.001) (.0003)
(Population)2*Certication -3.11e-09
(2.27e-09)
Constant 10.990 1.024 10.136 7.067 9.565 2.188
(5.847) (7.027) (5.398) (2.808) (12.413) (.334)
N 926 926 926 926 926 926
r2 .215 .213 .199 .199 .199 .192
Total Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .001 .0001 .0002 .0007 -.0001
(.001) (.002) (.0006) (.0002) (.0008)
(Population)2 6.14e-09 -4.27e-09 -3.38e-09
(7.20e-09) (1.46e-08) (2.29e-09)
Certication Dummy 744.307 790.650 799.980 833.522 817.080 791.372
(393.14) (343.34) (243.16) (262.16) (252.49) (176.074)
Population*Certication -.0006 .0004 -.002
(.006) (.008) (.001)
(Population)2*Certication -1.12e-08
(1.72e-08)
Constant 94.644 58.790 63.495 73.503 9.445 20.359
(35.790) (54.043) (36.250) (19.376) (64.172) (2.391)
N 926 926 926 926 926 926
r2 .393 .392 .392 .391 .383 .383
Note.{ Estimates of the certication dummy's coecient () and the polynomial's coecients. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of subsidized pupils enroled in the corresponding school level. Population is the
number of inhabitants of municipalities in 2001. Municipalities in Antioquia are excluded from estimations.
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
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Table 11: Dierence between Certied and Non-Certied Municipalities in the Number of Subsi-
dized Pupils in Private Schools, 2003 - 2006
School Level 2003 2004 2005 2006
Pre-primary 17.285 36.592 97.121 100.793
(14.556) (22.753) (47.413) (57.883)
Primary 92.795 184.516 430.392 358.856
(64.651) (78.308) (140.581) (150.958)
Lower Secondary 67.102 159.391 252.869 231.059
(62.045) (74.196) (90.185) (96.451)
Upper Secondary 16.766 33.008 53.139 65.805
(23.699) (24.088) (30.100) (26.467)
Total 193.948 413.507 833.522 756.513
(160.827) (176.640) (262.165) (272.388)
Note.{ Estimates of the certication dummy's coecient () of Model 4 in Table 10 for each school level. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of subsidized pupils enroled in the corresponding school level. Municipalities in
Antioquia are excluded from estimations.
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
Table 12: Dierence between Certied and Non-Certied Municipalities in the Number of Subsi-
dized Pupils in Private Schools (Small Sample)
School Level 2003 2004 2005 2006
Pre-primary 13.310 29.774 106.543 96.867
(15.167) (24.137) (51.362) (63.296)
Primary 67.012 120.033 406.53 339.11
(68.197) (94.579) (152.20) (156.95)
Lower Secondary 65.844 92.156 228.431 208.547
(68.029) (87.852) (93.112) (100.531)
Upper Secondary 21.668 14.695 50.810 56.598
(24.540) (25.138) (28.929) (28.094)
Total 167.833 256.658 792.321 701.125
(174.719) (209.230) (277.56) (282.32)
Note.{ Estimation sample includes all municipalities with population between 20 thousand inhabitants and 180000 thousand
inhabitants in 2001 except for those municipalities in Antioquia in the interval. Estimates of the certication dummy's coecient ()
of Model 4 in Table 10 for each school level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of
subsidized pupils enroled in the corresponding school level.
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
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Table 13: Dierence between Certied and Non-Certied Municipalities in the Number of
Subsidized Pupils in Private Schools, 2005 (Dierent Samples)
School Level (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-primary 111.399 97.121 125.084 106.543
(47.050) (47.413) (50.537) (51.362)
Primary 410.881 430.392 393.400 406.537
(158.888) (140.581) (179.579) (152.205)
Lower Secondary 198.805 252.869 181.158 228.431
(84.352) (90.185) (89.271) (93.112)
Upper Secondary 47.897 53.139 45.004 50.810
(29.013) (30.100) (27.338) (28.929)
Total 768.983 833.522 744.646 792.321
(261.062) (262.165) (287.435) (277.561)
N 1044 926 355 310
Note.{ Estimates of the certication dummy's coecient () of Model 4 in Table 10 for each school level. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of subsidized pupils enroled in the corresponding school level. Results in
Column (1) are obtained with the full sample. Results in Column (2) are obtained with the full sample excluding the municipalities
in Antioquia. Results in Column (3) are obtained with the sample of all municipalities with population between 20 thousand
inhabitants and 180000 thousand inhabitants in 2001. Results in Column (4) are obtained excluding those municipalities in
Antioquia from the sample of Column (3).
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
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Table 14: Dierence between Certied and Non-Certied Municipalities in the Increase of
Pupils between 2000 and 2001
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Pre-primary 105.711 93.515 79.909 78.167 74.263
(78.306) (79.582) (71.284) (65.188) (68.850)
Public
Schools
Primary 304.311 298.008 254.467 220.267 21.068
(362.763) (378.430) (325.798) (300.444) (320.314)
Lower Secondary 79.394 -.451 30.856 129.253 92.561
(228.458) (239.056) (206.020) (185.537) (202.370)
Upper Secondary -82.509 -128.847 -96.690 -26.826 -25.684
(85.456) (87.832) (69.840) (63.137) (78.325)
Total 406.907 262.225 268.541 400.861 162.208
(639.074) (664.315) (586.200) (544.130) (588.307)
Pre-primary 2.892 4.105 -12.561 -10.445 -17.624
(73.808) (58.076) (58.272) (57.402) (55.220)
Private
Schools
Primary -379.555 -30.568 -41.568 -21.980 -75.441
(374.223) (373.850) (255.067) (264.862) (231.500)
Lower Secundary 48.808 -112.838 -209.858 -206.349 -205.376
(247.953) (161.965) (186.723) (184.161) (182.404)
Upper Secondary 89.469 -43.512 -126.811 -123.494 -130.284
(134.792) (79.179) (90.621) (87.882) (88.738)
Total -238.386 -182.814 -390.798 -362.267 -428.724
(642.812) (501.783) (431.280) (431.200) (409.988)
Note.{ Estimates of the certication dummy's coecient () of Models 1 - 5 in Table 10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the dierence between 2001 and 2000 in the number of pupils enroled in the corresponding school level.
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
Table 15: Tuition Fees Dierence between Certied and Non-Certied Municipalities
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Public -0.07472 0.117173 0.222518 0.337281 -0.25331 0.103325 0.210001
Schools (0.286374) (0.30916) (0.300375) (0.357833) (0.35281) (0.3008) (0.2901)
Private 0.069669 0.026087 -0.11612 -0.32477 0.935683 0.415024 -0.04963
Schools (0.691119) (0.817843) (0.801712) (0.826128) (1.028172) (1.08488) (1.104675)
Note.{ Estimates of the certication dummy's coecient () using the quadratic polynomial with interactions (Equation (5) in the
text). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average tuition fees paid by senior students in the
municipality.
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
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Table 16: Dierence between Certied and Non-Certied Municipalities in the number of
inhabitants of school age
Age 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
6 years -93.643 -111.384 -119.744 -127.576 -136.076 -136.923
(150.180) (164.377) (172.627) (181.877) (191.780) (196.998)
7-11 years -52.662 -67.323 -112.068 -169.751 -224.649 -311.407
(547.474) (561.923) (613.925) (673.385) (740.657) (825.982)
12-15 years 383.115 370.507 336.057 302.574 273.009 241.603
(302.155) (316.782) (330.585) (351.670) (378.522) (419.446)
16-17 years 73.074 70.049 64.924 59.037 54.808 49.775
(147.314) (145.030) (144.190) (145.669) (149.149) (154.212)
6-17 years 309.473 261.929 169.190 63.675 -32.719 -156.991
(1021.400) (1070.724) (1143.833) (1234.431) (1340.891) (1474.480)
Note.{ Estimates of the certication dummy's coecient () using the quadratic polynomial with interactions (Equation (5) in the
text). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of inhabitants of school age. Each age range
correspond to each school level in the study, as follows: 6 year olds (pupils in pre-primary), 7-11 year olds (pupils in primary), 12-15
year olds (pupils in lower secondary), 16-17 year olds (pupils in upper secondary) and 6-17 year olds (pupils in pre-college school).
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
Table 17: Controls on the Subsidized-Pupils Dierence be-
tween Certied and Non-Certied Municipalities for Pre-
College School, 2005
Poverty Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Certication Dummy 833.52 804.95 804.66 810.32 819.21 818.43
(262.16) (248.86) (248.66) (241.62) (248.83) (240.26)
Proportion of Poor (%) -.181
(.315)
Welfare - Level 1 -.005
(.002)
Welfare - Level 2 .004
(.004)
Welfare - Level 3 .015
(.006)
Department Dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES
N 926 926 926 926 926 926
r2 .391 .459 .459 .485 .464 .492
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Table 17 Continued...
Municipal Budget (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Certication Dummy 802.35 802.38 792.32 802.25 807.29 794.39
(248.65) (248.69) (249.77) (248.68) (249.68) (232.77)
Tax Income per capita .0007
(.0009)
Industry-Commerce Tax
per capita
.001
(.001)
Education Spending per
capita
.001
(.0006)
Transfers per capita .00002
(1.00e-05)
Transfer Dependence -.192
(.228)
Tuition fee -5.659
(9.307)
Department Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 911 911 909 911 916 282
r2 .461 .461 .474 .461 .461 .498
Other Municipal Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Certication Dummy 805.16 792.67 802.33 790.53 792.35 790.37
(250.32) (249.84) (248.65) (248.03) (250.03) (250.03)
Bankrupt Dummy -30.618
(38.036)
Investment per capita .00003
(.00003)
Current Spending per capita .0002
(.0001)
Health Spending -.059
(.297)
Recreation Spending .298
(1.986)
Housing Spending -1.566
(1.347)
Department Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 924 909 911 914 914 914
r2 .462 .474 .461 .473 .473 .473
Education Spending (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Certication Dummy 797.00 791.25 789.42 792.37 792.85 792.83
(250.03) (250.30) (249.79) (250.05) (249.81) (249.87)
New Infrastructure (-1) .249
(.173)
Maintenance (-1) -.267
(.225)
Materials (-1) .448
(.409)
Teachers Training (-1) -.141
(.782)
Non-Earmarked .008
Transfers per capita (.006)
Own resources per capita .021
(.020)
Dept. Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 913 913 913 913 909 909
r2 .474 .474 .474 .473 .474 .474
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Table 17 Continued...
Conict (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Certication Dummy 805.46 805.40 801.77 801.00 802.85 798.82
(248.76) (248.75) (247.54) (244.57) (249.14) (243.72)
Expelled Population .008
(.071)
Received Population -.082
(.090)
Killings -1.600
(1.396)
Guerrilla Attacks -8.182
(4.113)
Paramilitary Attacks -5.247
(7.181)
Illegal Armies Attacks -8.362
(3.873)
Department Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 921 921 926 926 926 926
r2 .46 .46 .461 .468 .459 .47
Elections (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Certication Dummy 718.85 722.53 722.02 720.64 725.72
(235.90) (235.23) (235.19) (235.30) (234.85)
Same-Party Dummy 21.739
(20.918)
Liberal-Party Dummy 7.406
(12.889)
Conservative-Party Dummy -2.212
(6.479)
Winning Percentage .236
(.419)
Voter Turnout -.585
(.460)
Department Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
N 776 776 776 776 776
r2 .44 .439 .439 .439 .439
Note.{ Estimates of Model 4 in Table 10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of
subsidized pupils enroled in private schools in the pre-college level. The proportion of poor corresponds to data of 1993. Welfare
(levels 1-3) is measured as the number of targeted persons in each level per 1000 inhabitants in 2004. Tax income per capita, Tax on
Industry and Commerce per capita, Education Spending per capita, Transfers per capita, Investment per capita and Current
Spending per capita are variables of the municipal budget. All of them are measured in thousand pesos per inhabitant (constant
prices of 2004). Education Spending per capita is the money spent by the municipal government in education. Transfers per capita
and Transfer dependence includes both National and Department transfers. Tuition fees in the average tuition fee paid by senior
students. The bankrupt dummy takes value 1 if the municipality is under the bankrupt law. Health, recreation and housing spending
are the proportions that the municipality spends on these expenditures. New infrastructure, maintenance of infrastructure, material
and equipment and teachers training are the (lagged) proportions of investment spent on these expenditures. Non-earmarked
transfers per capita and own resources per capita correspond to those spent on education. They are also measured in thousand pesos
per inhabitant (constant prices of 2004). Expelled Population and Received Population measure forcibly displaces population and
measured as the number of persons per 1000 inhabitants. Killings is the number of killings than can be attributed to the illegal
armies. Guerrilla attacks is the number of attacks and combats in which the guerrilla has participated. Paramilitary attacks is the
number of attacks and combats in which the paramilitary has participated. Illegal armies attacks is the sum of the guerrilla and
paramilitary attacks. Same-party dummy takes value one if the mayor and the corresponding governor belong to the same party.
Winning percentage is the percentage of votes obtained by the winner. Voter turnout is the percentage of eligible voters who cast a
ballot in an election.
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
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Table 18: Dierence between Certied and Non-Certied Munici-
palities in the Number of Subsidized Pupils in Private Schools using
the pooled sample (2003 - 2006)
Pre-primary Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .00008 .0002 .0001 .0001 .00008
(.0001) (.0002) (.00006) (.00004) (.00009)
(Population)2 -5.32e-10 7.55e-10 -1.49e-10
(1.08e-09) (1.47e-09) (3.13e-10)
Certication Dummy 75.270 69.868 60.326 62.195 61.291 77.030
(43.427) (38.655) (27.730) (29.938) (28.893) (17.886)
Population*Certication -.0003 -.0005 -.0001
(.0006) (.0008) (.0002)
(Population)2*Certication 1.37e-09
(1.89e-09)
Constant 11.415 15.663 10.816 13.170 8.368 1.767
(5.090) (5.957) (4.527) (3.395) (7.130) (.364)
N 3213 3213 3213 3213 3213 3213
r2 .191 .19 .187 .188 .186 .182
Primary Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .0006 .0004 .0003 .0005 .00009
(.0006) (.0006) (.0002) (.0001) (.0003)
(Population)2 7.58e-10 -1.32e-09 -1.70e-09
(4.42e-09) (4.94e-09) (9.49e-10)
Certication Dummy 242.267 251.003 246.996 264.441 257.989 275.934
(137.694) (120.838) (86.261) (93.005) (90.384) (63.656)
Population*Certication -.0004 -.0002 -.0008
(.002) (.003) (.0006)
(Population)2*Certication -2.22e-09
(6.88e-09)
Constant 50.490 43.622 41.586 47.987 13.704 6.177
(22.088) (19.455) (15.015) (10.142) (25.840) (.972)
N 3213 3213 3213 3213 3213 3213
r2 .251 .251 .251 .25 .24 .239
Lower Secondary Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .0007 .0004 .0002 .0004 -.00003
(.0007) (.0004) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002)
(Population)2 2.46e-09 -1.35e-10 -1.68e-09
(4.75e-09) (3.19e-09) (5.67e-10)
Certication Dummy 161.643 172.551 156.226 173.918 167.089 161.009
(103.154) (91.949) (69.899) (74.564) (73.203) (45.478)
Population*Certication -.001 -.0008 -.0008
(.002) (.002) (.0003)
(Population)2*Certication -2.77e-09
(5.84e-09)
Constant 55.918 47.342 39.049 47.786 11.496 14.047
(22.036) (15.408) (12.052) (10.894) (15.949) (1.431)
N 3213 3213 3213 3213 3213 3213
r2 .142 .142 .141 .142 .124 .124
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Table 18 Continued...
Upper Secondary Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .00006 -.00005 .00007 .00008 .00004
(.00009) (.0001) (.00005) (.00002) (.00008)
(Population)2 -1.58e-10 -1.08e-09 -2.61e-10
(7.26e-10) (1.17e-09) (2.44e-10)
Certication Dummy 26.421 30.298 38.954 41.290 40.640 48.531
(34.347) (30.675) (22.190) (24.108) (23.329) (15.973)
Population*Certication .0003 .0004 -.00008
(.0005) (.0006) (.0001)
(Population)2*Certication -9.85e-10
(1.44e-09)
Constant 8.680 5.631 10.028 9.201 5.751 2.442
(3.156) (4.373) (3.507) (2.094) (6.444) (.287)
N 3213 3213 3213 3213 3213 3213
r2 .15 .15 .145 .142 .14 .138
Total Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Population .001 .0009 .0006 .001 .0002
(.001) (.001) (.0004) (.0003) (.0006)
(Population)2 2.53e-09 -1.78e-09 -3.79e-09
(9.61e-09) (9.33e-09) (1.66e-09)
Certication Dummy 505.601 523.720 502.503 541.843 527.010 562.503
(274.859) (243.437) (179.307) (192.267) (187.701) (121.094)
Population*Certication -.001 -.001 -.002
(.004) (.005) (.001)
(Population)2*Certication -4.60e-09
(1.38e-08)
Constant 126.503 112.257 101.479 118.144 39.320 24.432
(46.767) (38.642) (29.213) (22.474) (45.143) (2.449)
N 3213 3213 3213 3213 3213 3213
r2 .261 .261 .261 .261 .247 .247
Note.{ Estimates of the certication dummy's coecient () and polynomial's coecients of Models 1-6 in Table 10 for each school
level pooling the sample. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of subsidized pupils
enroled in the corresponding school level in each year of the study.
* Denotes signicance at 10%, two tailed tests.
** Denotes signicance at 5%, two tailed tests.
*** Denotes signicance at 1%, two tailed tests.
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Table 19: Robust Condence Intervals
School Level Level of Signicance Condence Interval
Pre-primary 95 3.440048 120.9493
Identical Primary 95 81.91736 446.9644
Specication Lower Secondary 95 27.58499 320.2517
Error Upper Secondary 95 -6.023275 88.60228
Total 95 164.5166 919.1702
Pre-primary 90 3.5693225 120.82
95 -7.4451348 131.83445
99 -29.474049 153.86337
Primary 90 67.549263 461.33253
95 30.557502 498.32429
99 -43.426021 572.30781
Independent Lower Secondary 90 10.247198 337.58948
Specication 95 -20.503137 368.33982
Error 99 -82.003808 429.84049
Upper Secondary 90 -11.083187 93.662193
95 -20.922904 103.50191
99 -40.60234 123.18135
Total 90 138.38983 945.29697
95 62.589459 1021.0973
99 -89.011277 1172.6981
Note.{ The condence intervals are calculated following the procedure that appears in Lee and Card (2008).
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Figure 1: Overall Enrolment (Number of Pupils)
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Figure 2: Gross Enrolment Rate (%)
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Figure 3: Transfers to municipalities per capita
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Note.{ Transfers per capita are measured in thousand pesos per inhabitant (constant prices of 2004). It includes both National and
Department transfers to municipalities.
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Figure 4: Increase of the Number of Pupils in Public Schools Compared to 2001
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Figure 5: Number of Subsidized Pupils in Private Schools by school level, 2005
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Figure 6: Population of School Age in 2005
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